Canada in Afghanistan
In Kabul, Washington, Brussels, London, Paris, and Amsterdam, the debate over NATO’s role in Afghanistan is building. President Obama is not only considering the possibility of General McChrystal’s recommended troop surge and tactical shift towards far greater civilian protection, but more importantly, he is reconsidering the broader strategic objectives of the mission. Is the goal to protect America from a resurgent al-Qaeda, to build an Afghan state that can hold the Taliban at bay, or to reconfigure both Afghanistan and Pakistan? The answer will drive his decision in the coming weeks. As the president deliberates, the U.S. media and public are increasingly engaged.
In Canada, while there is a similar conversation occurring behind the closed doors of government – our mandarins must decide what we will do after the 2011 deadline set by parliament in March 2008 – there has been an astonishing silence in the public domain. What should Canada be doing in Afghanistan post-2011?
The government of Canada has skirted this issue in public with various opaque statements by the prime minister, the minister of Defence and other members of the Conservative cabinet. They have confirmed our withdrawal but have given hardly any indication as to what this will look like, whether a military presence will remain to carry out the development and training tasks they assert will continue or whether the U.S. will fill the void. Meanwhile Lt. General Andrew Leslie, the head of the Canadian army, has stated that they “currently do not have any plans, or even any line diagrams on a blank sheet of paper for post-2011.”
Motivated by the belief that decisions need to be taken long before 2011, that we can’t just up and pull out – that there are substantial strategic, ethical, and financial considerations – last week we convened a roundtable at the University of British Columbia in order to discuss these critical issues. We started with our own “blank sheet” and to fill it in, several seasoned Canadian experts who have lived and breathed Afghanistan over the last eight years, including Gordon Smith, Chris Alexander, and Graeme Smith. We posed a series of guiding questions that we hoped would incite debate. They were as follows:
1) Public support for the Afghan mission stands at 37 per cent in Canada and roughly half of Canadians are in support of a civilian mission post-2011. How are domestic politics likely to influence the shape of Canada's involvement? And what influence should they have?
2) The Canadian government has committed itself to a set of tasks for the benefit of the Afghan people. At the same time, the fighting has killed 131 Canadian soldiers and one diplomat. The war has cost between $11-12 billion. What responsibilities and obligations have we incurred? To the Afghan people? To NATO and the UN? To Canadians?
3) The Government has been unclear as to whether a contingent of Canadian forces will remain to protect delivery of assistance, or whether the ensuing void post-withdrawal will be covered by our U.S. and NATO allies. Moreover, does the withdrawal of a “mere” 2800 Canadians, compared with the U.S. 80,000, really mean a “gap”? What would assistance look like without military support? Can we “do” development without the military? What are the implications of a withdrawal for NATO and U.S. relations?
4) What are the options for our involvement? What are the costs and benefits of different options? What are the standards of evaluation? What is desirable? What is doable? How do we avoid what Gen. Hillier recently called “pie in the sky” ideas about Afghanistan? How do we avoid such ideas and ensure success in whatever it is that we commit ourselves to post-2011.
It is a tall order, we know, but we hope that this web forum, based on last week’s roundtable meeting, will be, at the very least, the start of a much needed discussion on these important issues.
The Global Context
- First Posted: Nov 12 2009 18:16 PM
- Updated: 7 months ago
VIDEO: Canada's approach in Afghanistan should be determined above all by the international strategy.
Debate and decisions in Canada regarding our military presence in Afghanistan should be conditioned first and foremost by international strategy towards the country – based on a clear understanding of achievements to date and the drivers of continuing instability. What will it take to bring stability to Afghanistan? The challenge has five principal dimensions:
Waziristan and Baluchistan. This is not only an Afghan conflict. The current insurgency is being commanded and facilitated by leadership councils in Pakistan – principally in North Waziristan and northeast Baluchistan. It will require hard-hitting security operations to disrupt and ultimately dismantle them. Any lesser policy amounts to appeasement of the world’s most potent known terrorist network.
Regional Economic Cooperation and Business-Led Growth. Afghanistan’s assets should be used to advantage. Building on current World Bank and ADB initiatives, rail, road, transit, and energy grid infrastructure should be expanded in all directions – with priority given to more stable regions. SAARC and ECO free trade initiatives should be supported. The SCO should be welcomed as a reconstruction partner – on a larger scale. Oil, gas and mining should be developed on the basis of international best practices and inclusive, supervised bidding processes. As a condition, Afghanistan should implement an agenda dramatically to improve the business climate – as called for by the Enabling Environment Conference in Kabul in July 2007.
Institutional Support. After 30 years of war, Afghanistan’s state, civil society and private sector were ground into dust. Some sectors have recovered, and will now thrive under good management. Others need fresh investments, on a large scale, through prioritized programs. Justice and police reform should be scaled up massively. Agriculture and governance need major new programs. Donor support should graduate to these new sectors – the critical drivers of poverty reduction.
Effective Counter-Insurgency. Without progress against sanctuaries and sufficient forces on the ground, counter-insurgency – not only in Afghanistan but anywhere – is doomed to failure. Success in Afghanistan requires high-quality support for a much larger army and police force – with combined strength more than double their current size. It will also require tough-minded steps to strip out the most predatory office-holders in southern Afghanistan – allies of the Taliban and drug traffickers in all but name. Counter-insurgency operations should come increasingly under Afghan leadership, within joint strategy, planning, and operational structures. If complemented by heavy support for humanitarian delivery and human rights monitoring, these measures will ensure better protection for communities – both in reality and perception.
Peace Process. If and only if the previous four challenges start to be met, prospects for a substantive peace process will start to emerge. Among its key elements will be (i) disarmament and formal demobilization; (ii) reintegration programs; (iii) security guarantees; and (iv) regional confidence-building, including demarcation and mutual recognition of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.















Comments
Re:Marks
“ Audio track worthless - don't waste your time listening. A transcript might be useful. The text is not a transcript. Was the text written by Alexander?
Brent Beach