Four Wars on the Verge of Erupting

While the world has mostly paid attention to the Darfur region in western Sudan, it is the southern part of the country that is most at risk.

Headlines about Sudan have for several years focused on the government-orchestrated campaign of violence in Darfur, and the controversial 2009 indictment of Sudanese President Omer Hassan Al-Bashir by the International Criminal Court (ICC) on charges of war crimes.

The ICC recently added to these three counts of genocide allegedly committed against the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa ethnic groups.

While Darfur remains violent despite the ICC’s efforts and the belated presence of the hybrid African Union-United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), a potentially much larger conflict in Sudan with broad regional implications is looming in the near future.

While reviewing African and Asian countries that are considered to be at high risk of outbreaks of internal mass violence, U.S. Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair noted in his February 2010 briefing to Congress that “among those countries, a new mass killing or genocide is most likely to occur in southern Sudan.”

The trigger for this new explosion of violence, if it occurs, will be the referendum on South Sudan’s independence that is scheduled to occur in less than six months’ time, by no later than Jan. 9 2011. The referendum process was part of the terms of the Kenyan-managed January 2005 Naivasha Accords and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which ended more than two decades of a bloody North-South civil war that cost an estimated two million Sudanese lives.

Warning signs of impending trouble are not hard to find. Both of the ruling parties – the National Congress Party (NCP) led by President Bashir in Khartoum, which dominates the Government of National Unity, and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M), which rules South Sudan from its capital city Juba – have sought to impose their positions upon their populations.

Bashir’s government has banned newspapers that express views supporting southern secession; while the SPLA/M is reportedly suppressing any dissenting elements they suspect might open the door for northern manipulation of the referendum. Civic education regarding the pros and cons of unity versus independence has been rendered impossible, despite the recent creation (after several months of delay) of the South Sudan Referendum Commission, which is tasked with identifying and registering eligible voters and preparing electoral lists.

A recent report by a coalition of 26 international humanitarian and human rights NGOs described preparations for the referendum as “alarmingly” poor, and warned “a failed referendum could plunge Sudan back into war once more.” General Bashir has warned that a southern vote to secede could have “explosive” consequences, while southern Sudan President Salva Kiir Mayardit was reported in late 2009 as having openly called for secession.

In May 2010, the SPLM accused the NCP-led northern government of arming militias in advance of the 2011 referendum. In his July 19 2010 report to the UN Security Council, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon observed that “The prospect of a joint unity campaign is proving contentious” and that many South Sudanese representatives have stated “that it is too late to make unity attractive.”

According to most observers, the first key for the future of North-South relations in Sudan is to hold the referendum on schedule, monitored and managed by a strong international presence. This should include the UN – which has already deployed almost 10,000 military personnel in the UN Mission in the Sudan – as well as the African Union, the League of Arab States, the regional Intergovernmental Authority on Development, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the European Union, and at least several of the permanent members of the UN Security Council. These are the organizations and countries that in 2005 served as the so-called “guarantors” of the Naivasha Accords and the CPA. The result of the referendum vote must be credible and clear, and verified by international observers.

The second key concern for avoiding the possible outbreak of renewed conflict is that North and South Sudan must agree on a number of post-referendum arrangements that will satisfy each side’s interests. The future of the oil-rich region of Abyei especially remains a contested topic, with Khartoum reportedly relying on oil revenues for 60 per cent of its annual income and Abyei scheduled to hold its own separate but simultaneous referendum on whether to become part of South Sudan.

Again, firm and clear international support by the guarantor organizations and governments will be essential if there is to be progress rather than a renewed outbreak of a war that inevitably would embroil the security and economic interests of neighbouring states such as Uganda (a previous active supporter of the SPLA/M), Kenya (also pro-South but more cautious in its support), Chad, Eritrea, Libya, Ethiopia, and Egypt.

In a divided state and a region in which conflict and suffering has been, and is still, a common daily occurrence, avoiding the return to violence that Dennis Blair spoke of will take a degree of constructive effort and consistent support for the peaceful resolution of disputes by internal and external parties that too often in the past has proven elusive.