Iran: To Strike or to Strangle?

Assessing the potential uses and consequences of an Iranian nuclear weapons program.

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Faced with slow-motion nuclear proliferation in Iran, many are discussing preventative strikes on Iranian facilities. The West’s Iran policy should be determined by a simple calculation: Are the risks involved in striking Iran greater than the risks of sanctions failing, multiplied by the cost of a subsequently nuclear-armed Iran? Recent brinksmanship over the Straits of Hormuz indicate that sanctions are hurting Iran, but what if sanctions fail and Iran goes nuclear?

Understanding the potential uses and consequences of Iranian nuclear weapons is crucial to understanding the cost and benefits of current sanctions and future strikes. If the tense history of the Cold War has taught us one thing, it is this: The uses of nuclear weapons are limited, regardless of regime or religion. Because of this basic fact, the West has an interest in continuing to tighten sanctions on Iran, but not in striking Iranian nuclear facilities. Nuclear weapons can conceivably be used for four purposes: deterrence, blackmail, shielding, and martyrdom.

Deterrence: Nuclear weapons are the ultimate insurance policy, serving to deter an invasion of the homeland and prevent foreign nuclear strikes. No nuclear-armed regime has ever been overthrown or hit by nuclear weapons. Iran lives in a bad neighbourhood surrounded by foes, such as Iraq, that have sought nuclear weapons, and states, such as the U.S., that have openly called for regime change. As such, deterrence is the most plausible use of Iranian nuclear weapons. Although the West may deplore the regime of the Ayatollahs, its treatment of women, and its gross violation of human rights, the maintenance of the regime through nuclear deterrence is not a sufficient reason to launch preventative strikes on Iran.

Blackmail: Iran may use nuclear weapons to blackmail its opponents and bully its neighbours. Yet, there is not a single record of any state successfully blackmailing another state using nuclear weapons. The threat of a nuclear attack is simply not credible, because few foreign-policy interests are great enough to justify breaking the nuclear taboo. If no one believes you will carry out a threat, then there is no point in damaging your reputation by making one. This is why nuclear-armed states have accepted losing wars with non-nuclear states rather than blackmailing them with nuclear strikes. Moreover, nuclear blackmail is not useful against other nuclear-armed powers since they would only invite a devastating nuclear retaliation. As it turns out, the two greatest threats to Iran – the U.S. and Israel – are nuclear powers. Importantly, both states have secure second-strike capabilities, meaning that Iran could never hope to wipe out its enemies’ arsenals in an overwhelming first strike. Israel may be three times smaller than New Brunswick, but it has invested in submarines carrying nuclear-tipped missiles, guaranteeing deadly Israeli retaliation.

Shielding: The most realistic and serious concern of an Iranian nuclear arsenal is its use of a shield under which Iran will pursue a more aggressive foreign policy. In other words, nuclear weapons will prevent states from forcefully retaliating to Iranian provocations. Yet, even in this more plausible scenario, it’s important to consider how nuclear weapons would change current Iranian foreign policy. In Iraq, Iran has already secured greater influence thanks to demographic dominance of the Shia population rather than military force. In Syria, Iran is currently losing a regional ally and will therefore have fewer opportunities for influence. In Afghanistan, it faces a resurgent Taliban, who are viscerally opposed to Shia Islam, and who went to the brink of war with Iran in 1998. In both Lebanon and Gaza, a nuclear Iran could mean a more dangerous Hezbollah and Hamas. However, Iran has become a victim of its own success as both groups have transformed into powerful political parties. Will they be willing to jeopardize hard-earned political gains simply to curry favour with Iran? Lastly, closing the Straits of Hormuz would be self-defeating, shutting off Iran’s main export hub and pushing Gulf States further into the arms of the West. In short, as with the Soviet Union during the Cold War, an emboldened nuclear Iran can be contained.

Martyrdom and Terrorism: The wild card in dealing with Iran is the potential that the regime would use nuclear weapons as martyrs to achieve transcendental goals, which defy worldly cost-benefit calculations. In a recent CBC interview, Prime Minister Harper stated regarding Iran’s leadership: “In my judgment, these are people who have a particular, you know, fanatically religious worldview, and their statements imply to me no hesitation of using nuclear weapons if they see them achieving their religious or political purposes.” For all their talk and bluster, Iran’s leaders are hardy political survivors – not suicidal fanatics – who have gone to extraordinary lengths to retain their grip on power. The logic of political survival domestically, combined with mutually assured destruction internationally, limits the potential uses of nuclear weapons. Could Iran provide nuclear weapons to terrorists to carry out its deeds instead? The potential for nuclear terrorism is horrifying, particularly because terrorists do not have a return address to keep them in check. However, nuclear materials carry distinct “fingerprints,” which allow nuclear forensics to identify the source of nuclear material, and therefore deliver swift retaliation. Partially for this reason, no state has ever provided non-state actors with nuclear weapons.

The risks of a nuclear Iran are undoubtedly real, and justify the strengthening of international sanctions. At a minimum, preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons will strengthen the non-proliferation regime, and will mean fewer twitchy fingers on fewer triggers and the attendant risks of nuclear accidents. However, the risks of a nuclear Iran do not justify the alternative risks of launching a preventative war.

This article was originally published for the Canadian International Council.

Photo courtesy of Reuters.